Robustness and alignment in multi-agent recommender systems. When LLM agents plan, call tools, exchange messages, and carry memory, risk becomes a system-level property. This tutorial gives you a vocabulary for it: a risk taxonomy, an evaluation framework that scales from component to composition, mitigations across the lifecycle, and a live attack/defense demo.
Multi-agent recommender systems are emerging as a new design paradigm: specialized, LLM-powered agents reason over context, invoke tools, exchange intermediate outputs, and maintain memory across sessions. Composition buys modularity and transparency, but wiring together agents' roles, authority, and communication channels also compounds risk. Failures that are invisible when agents are tested in isolation surface only once the agents interact.
What is being composed, what authority each agent holds, and where risk enters: separating connectivity (who can talk to whom) from workflow (who does what, in what order).
Two lenses applied throughout: amplified vs. emergent risk, and the drift → misalignment → compromise threat tiers, each tied to the composition patterns that produce it.
An evaluation framework organized by scope × setting, with concrete benchmarks per cell, plus design-time, runtime, and post-deployment mitigations.
A morning half-day tutorial, 8:30 to 12:00. One 30-minute break sits right after the demo, so attendees can red-team it before Part III picks up.
From classical to LLM to agentic recommenders, and the levels of autonomy that separate them. Recurring topologies and a taxonomy of system architectures, plus the attack surfaces and agent roles later parts build on.
Amplified vs. emergent risks and how to classify a given mechanism; emergent failures such as contagion, false consensus, and collusion; the drift / misalignment / compromise threat tiers. Then a live ConnaCF demo: one dissemination attack and one extraction attack across two connectivity knobs (hard 10 to 15 min).
Attendees are invited to play with the demo and submit a “crash” red-teaming prompt.
Evaluation at three levels (component, interaction, composition) and the security-utility trade-offs it surfaces. Defences across the lifecycle, from design time to post-incident, and where governance and audit fall short for composed systems.
Most attack, defence, and evaluation work so far comes from general multi-agent safety, not recommenders specifically. Benchmarks as the concrete next step, whether general agentic-AI governance transfers to RS, and wrap-up.
Open floor for all four speakers.
Room turnover.
Timings are indicative and will track the final RecSys'26 program.
A live walk-through of attacking and defending multi-agent collaborative filtering through connectivity, built on AgentCF. We don't ask you to clone and run during the talk: we walk it, then you play with the hosted version over the break.
ConnaCF instantiates a multi-agent recommender as a bipartite user-item agent graph and
sweeps two connectivity axes: candidate count k (k=0 MACF → k=2 AgentCF → k=3)
and catalog concentration ρ (sparse → dense). The same attack that fizzles in a sparse
graph can become an epidemic in a dense one: that gap is the amplified-vs-emergent story.
k and catalog concentration ρ.Runs on a Bedrock-free local path (local Qwen3 + judge), so no AWS account is required to reproduce.
Everything in one place: slides, the survey, the living reading list, the demo, and the recording.
The full reveal.js deck. Press S for speaker notes, Esc for overview.
📄In prepThe companion TMLR survey on robustness & alignment in MARS.
📚In prepTrustworthy RecSys monograph chapter (Foundations & Trends in IR).
🗂️Live · weeklyAuto-crawled Awesome list of MARS risk & trustworthiness papers.
⚔️AvailableAttack/defense code on multi-agent collaborative filtering.
🎥After eventTalk recording, posted after RecSys'26.